Update the EBLL tracker by including which data fields are required, establishing what type of information can be entered into each data field, and disallowing case closure if required information is missing.

PIH in coordination with other HUD offices as necessary, research and address potential causes of the variance in the number of EBLL cases among States on the EBLL tracker and identify solutions that are within HUD's control.

Corrective Action Taken

On September 10, 2025, HUD took action to close priority recommendation 6 from HUD OIG Evaluation Report 2021-OE-0011b, Improvements are Needed to HUD’s Processes for Monitoring Elevated Blood Lead Levels and Lead-Based Paint Hazards in Public Housing, issued February 28, 2023.  HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing, Office of Field Operations (OFO), conducted research and comparative analysis of nine identified field offices and PHAs with unreported elevated blood lead levels (EBLL) and obtained the missing documentation and entered it into the EBLL tracker.  Additionally, OFO revised the EBLL tracker job aid, published new EBLL guidance, held office hours and group and individual trainings for OFO staff, and developed a PowerBI dashboard to accompany the EBLL tracker to allow for the visual monitoring of EBLL cases with outstanding or nearing deadlines.  These corrective actions have increased the effectiveness of the EBLL tracker and enhanced the accuracy of HUD records.  HUD can now ensure that EBLL cases are both reported and recorded in the EBLL tracker appropriately so that it can track progress towards addressing EBLLs and close EBLL cases in a timely manner.

Create a plan and timeline that outlines OFO’s proposal to move the LBPR tracker to a different platform.

Develop a timeliness standard in the LBPR tracker to establish expectations for how often field office staff must reach out to PHAs on the LBPR tracker to discuss measures that will resolve cases in a timely manner.

Update HUD regulations, policies, and procedures following the regulatory process required by the amended Lead Safe Housing Rule, in consideration of CDC's lowered BLRV of 3.5 ug/dL.

Corrective Action Taken

The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued a new joint notice, Implementation of the Reduced Elevated Blood Lead Level (EBLL) Triggering Response in Certain Assisted Target Housing, for the Office of Lead Hazard Control  and Health Homes (OLHCHH), the Office of Community Planning and Development, the Office of Housing, and the Office of Public and Indian Housing. The notice provides guidance on when owners and HUD staff must undertake actions when they are notified of a child under age 6 residing in HUD-assisted housing with an EBLL at or above the threshold level of 3.5 μg/dL. HUD published the notice on each of the offices’ public webpages.

Provide more detailed guidance to HUD reviewers on benchmarks for each performance standard.

Update the PAR template to ensure that HUD reviewers include required information.

Assess HUD reviewers’ skills and readiness to determine the appropriate frequency of training.

Provide more detailed guidance to HUD reviewers and FHEO regional directors on when and under what circumstances to recommend or issue a PIP.

HUD OCIO and the Office of Administration should implement procedures to ensure proper validation of media sanitization in accordance with HUD Media Protection Procedures 2.0 (February 2022) and form HUD 1067A, Certification of Sanitization (derived from metric 36).

HUD OCIO should ensure that system owners and information system security officers consistently test their ISCPs and upload the test results to CSAM in accordance with HUD’s defined ISCP testing policy (derived from metric 63).

The OIG has determined that the contents of this recommendation would not be appropriate for public disclosure and has therefore limited its distribution to selected officials.

The OIG has determined that the contents of this recommendation would not be appropriate for public disclosure and has therefore limited its distribution to selected officials.

The OIG has determined that the contents of this recommendation would not be appropriate for public disclosure and has therefore limited its distribution to selected officials.

The OIG has determined that the contents of this recommendation would not be appropriate for public disclosure and has therefore limited its distribution to selected officials.

Define and communicate policies and procedures to ensure that its products, system components, systems, and services comply with its cybersecurity and supply chain risk management (SCRM) requirements.  This recommendation includes (a) identification and prioritization of externally provided systems (new and legacy), components, and services; (b) how HUD maintains awareness of its upstream suppliers; (c) the integration of acquisition processes, tools, and techniques to use the acquisition process to protect the supply chain; and (d) contract tools or procurement methods to confirm that contractors are meeting their obligations. 

Corrective Action

HUD finalized its Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) policy in April 2025, which utilizes a SCRM questionnaire to assess each vendor’s supply chain risk, and identifies and prioritizes risks accordingly.  HUD’s SCRM program team manages a supply chain risk register which records prior and current vendors, and those that have undergone risk assessments to maintain visibility into its upstream suppliers and track changes over time.  HUD also used multiple tools such as supply chain risk criteria and sourcing research and market analysis to evaluate vendors and strengthen protection of the supply chain during acquisition.  By implementing these procedures, as well as, having HUD’s program management team conducting annual and quarterly performance reviews for all vendors, HUD ensures contractors are meeting their contractual obligations.

The OIG has determined that the contents of this recommendation would not be appropriate for public disclosure and has therefore limited its distribution to selected officials.

The OIG has determined that the contents of this recommendation would not be appropriate for public disclosure and has therefore limited its distribution to selected officials.

The OIG has determined that the contents of this recommendation would not be appropriate for public disclosure and has therefore limited its distribution to selected officials.

The OIG has determined that the contents of this recommendation would not be appropriate for public disclosure and has therefore limited its distribution to selected officials.