We also recommend that the Director of the Philadelphia Office of Public Housing work in conjunction with HUD’s Office of Lead Hazard Control and Healthy Homes to provide training to the Authority’s staff involved with managing lead-based paint and technical assistance in developing and implementing new procedures and controls.

We also recommend that the Director of the Philadelphia Office of Public Housing work in conjunction with HUD’s Office of Lead Hazard Control and Healthy Homes to assess the quality of the lead-based paint inspections and risk assessments performed by the Authority’s contractors to determine whether they are sufficient to fulfill HUD’s requirements.

We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Housing and Voucher Programs enhance SEMAP or develop a new performance measurement process that would identify PHAs with underperforming HCV Programs, which should include an assessment of PHAs’ ability to maximize assistance to house families.

We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Field Operations Provide additional training and guidance to field office program staff on SEMAP scoring, rating, and verification procedures, including confirmatory reviews, quality control reviews, and adjustments to the SEMAP process.

We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Field Operations provide training and guidance to field office program staff on SEMAP scoring, rating, and verification procedures, including confirmatory reviews, quality control reviews, and adjustments, as appropriate, for the revised SEMAP process.

Create a plan and timeline that outlines OFO’s proposal to make necessary improvements to the EBLL tracker, such as moving it to a different platform.

Provide field office staff access to historical data in the EBLL tracker to be readily available as needed, with adequate protection of PII.

Update the EBLL tracker to show whether one or multiple children have an EBLL and whether the unit, building, or development previously had an EBLL reported.

Update the EBLL tracker by including which data fields are required, establishing what type of information can be entered into each data field, and disallowing case closure if required information is missing.

PIH in coordination with other HUD offices as necessary, research and address potential causes of the variance in the number of EBLL cases among States on the EBLL tracker and identify solutions that are within HUD's control.

Status

As of November 13, 2024, the PIH Office of Field Operations (OFO) had completed its outreach data collection and identified 9 public housing authorities that had not completed the required EBLL reporting actions and that OFO informed the field office directors overseeing the appropriate PHAs that they had until November 6, 2024, to upload the proper information to the trackers. As of January 29, 2025, OFO field office directors and their staff were still updating and inputting EBLL cases and relevant documentation into the EBLL tracker due to delays in responses from PHAs. The estimated completion date is February 28, 2025.

Analysis

To fully address this recommendation, OFO must provide evidence that it coordinated with other HUD offices and identified the causes of the variances in the number of EBLL cases among states on the EBLL tracker. OFO must also demonstrate that it fully remedied the causes of the variances. Alternatively, OFO must provide an explanation sufficient to support a claim that it could not identify the causes of the variances or develop and implement solutions for problems it identified in its research.

Implementation of this recommendation will result in improved HUD data of EBLL cases of children living in public housing across the country. Accurate reporting of EBLL cases to HUD is essential so that HUD can ensure PHAs take effective environmental interventions that help prevent additional lead exposure.

Create a plan and timeline that outlines OFO’s proposal to move the LBPR tracker to a different platform.

Develop a timeliness standard in the LBPR tracker to establish expectations for how often field office staff must reach out to PHAs on the LBPR tracker to discuss measures that will resolve cases in a timely manner.

Develop and issue a departmental grant accrual validation policy or update the existing grant accrual policy to include the validation process. The policy should include 1) specific control activities over the grant accrual validation and outline all of the specific roles and responsibilities; 2) a periodic review of the grant accrual validation to evaluate and reassess its continued relevance and control effectiveness, and ensure any changes are designed and implemented appropriately; and 3) a clear communication plan that requires formal and documented communications between appropriate program offices and OCFO to ensure the validation results are used to update the grant accrual methodology and subsequent period’s estimate, as appropriate.

Develop and document internal procedures to ensure the OCFO’s responsibilities specified within the new or updated grant accrual validation policy are addressed.

Develop and implement procedures to ensure that planning for the CPD grant accrual validation is done early in the accounting cycle to allow for: • Sufficient resources to be available to perform the validation of the prior year grant accrual. • Validation efforts to start earlier to allow for follow-up on non-responsive grantees or grantees that provided incomplete information. • Materiality risk to be considered when planning and evaluating the CPD grant accrual validation.

Revise CPD Validation Review Instructions to specify documentation requirements similar to those provided to the grantee and specify verification of dates for when the costs were incurred.

As part of the validation process for CPD’s accrued grant liabilities, review CPD’s accrued grant liabilities estimation methodology to ensure that it is based on verifiable grantee supporting documentation and all assumptions and variables used for the grant accrual estimate were properly established, supported, and documented.

Establish a formal policy addressing HUD’s federal awarding agency responsibilities under 2 CFR § 200.513(c). The policy should identify those involved in the process and their roles in addressing this single audit oversight function. The policy should also address how it will be carried out and documented.

Perform a complete agency-wide fraud risk assessment (which incorporates the fraud risk assessments performed at the program level) and use the results to develop and implement an agency-wide plan to move HUD’s fraud risk management program out of the ad hoc phase.

Status

HUD has made steady progress in building its Fraud Risk Management program. In FY 2024, HUD received Congressional approval to establish the Office of the Chief Risk Officer (OCRO). With its Fraud Risk Management Policy in place since 2022, OCRO worked with the HUD Risk Management Council to develop the Department’s approach and establish a cross-functional approach for Fraud Risk Management program accountability. The CRO also completed a fraud risk exposure assessment method that enables the Department to provide a risk-based approach to prioritize program fraud risk assessments and a department-level Fraud Risk Management Playbook to align HUD’s cross-functional activities and accountability to the GAO Fraud Risk Framework and CFO Council practices. The CRO is also working on tools and templates that are being customized for HUD program offices to help them complete their fraud risk assessments. Priority program offices are targeted to complete fraud risk assessments in 2025.

Analysis

While HUD has made progress in the area of fraud risk management, there is still work to be done for HUD to complete an entity-wide fraud risk assessment. HUD's exposure analysis will help it to determine where to focus its efforts. The Department still needs to conduct program-specific fraud risk assessments. Based on the demonstration by Multifamily Housing (MFH), we believe that MFH has made great progress in its fraud risk assessment, and we are encouraged that it has identified areas of weakness that it plans to target. However, Public and Indian Housing (PIH) and Community Planning and Development (CPD) have not been able to demonstrate progress in this area. We believe that the tools and templates the OCRO is developing, along with the continued support, will help PIH and CPD to complete these assessments.

To fully address this recommendation, HUD must provide evidence that it has performed an agency-wide fraud risk assessment performed at the program level, adopted and implemented its fraud risk assessment program departmental policy, and that each HUD program office has established office-specific risk programs.

Develop and implement a procedure to collect and analyze reported suspected instances of fraud, along with other relevant data points, that can be leveraged to develop more robust antifraud risk mitigation tools.